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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
::ABBibJ C. SORENSEN, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
-vs.-
~. ~IORGAN SORENSEN, 
Def end ant and Respondent. 
Case No. 
11013 
PETITION FO·R REHEARING 
Defendant-respondent now petitions the Court, under 
Hnle 7fi (e), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, for rehearing 
.,f th<' aho\·e entitled matter and asserts that, in making 
its decision herein, this Court erred in the following 
partil'ulars: 
1. By ruling that defendant-respondent's reduc-
tion in salary of $6,000.00 per year was "vol-
untary" and therefore not properly to be 
considered as a ground for alimony modifica-
tion. 
2. By ruling that the record does not support 
the contention that the original alimony decree 
was based, in part, upon the trial court's con-
viction that the major expense of rearing the 
parties' daughter, then living with plaintiff-
1 
appellant, had ht•en assumed hy plailltiff 
appellant. 
3. By ruling that no E'Yidrnce ·was g-i"n•n u1 
offoned to show that tlwre had hccn ~uh­
stantial improyemcnt in the liq11iclity of am.I 
the income from the ·\\'ife 's separate property 
4. By failing to defer to the trial rourt 's di~. 
cretion in regard to the modification of illi 
alimony award. 
Respectfully submitted, 
FRANK J. ALLEN 
CLYDE;, l\IECHAM & PRATT 
351 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Res1J011de1d 
2 
BRIEF IN SUP'P'ORT OF 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
POINT I. 
THE COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT 
1H~FT~~DANT-RESPONDENT 'S REDUC-
TlON IN SALARY OF $6,000.00 PER YEAR 
~WAS "VOLUNTARY" AND THEREFORE 
0:'0T PROPERLY TO BE CONSIDERED AS 
.\ GROUND FOR ALIMONY MODIFICA-
TIO;.J. 
In her brief on the appeal from the order modifying 
niimon.\-, plaintiff-appellant asserted that defendant-
n~~pornlent had "voluntarily" accepted a $6,000.00 per 
Y(';n· recludion in income. There is no support in the 
11rnr1l for tl1c assertion that the reduction was volu;ntary. 
Tlw <rnl.\- evidence relating to the reduction is the minute 
( illl')' of the resolution effecting it. 
,\s a matter of fact, defendant-respondent strongly 
11·~ic:kd the reduction of his income. The trial court 
thought it unnecessary for defendant-respondent to put 
on extem;ive proof that he opposed the reduction of his 
in(·omc'. In the absence of evidence, it is hardly proper 
t'r 1r tliis Court to rule that the trial court was obliged 
I 11 11ss 11 me defendant's concurrence in the reduction as 
11 111altcr of laze. 
l 1~n·n if defendant-respondent had not opposed the 
11 ·rl1wtion, the circumstances which prompted it were 
3 
beyond his control. Defendant had been working , 
minimum of GO hours per zceek (Record, pages 53, 4) ti
1 
produce the income on which the trial court, by thr> 
original decree, impressed what \Ve believe to be th(· 
heaviest alimony burden in Utah's family relations his-
tory. Defendant is now 55 years of age, an age at which 
he could have been expected to decelerate even had hii 
marriage to plaintiff-appellant not deteriorated. What 
this court appears to be telling defendant is that he must 
continue to u·ork a 60 hour week until his death. The 
Court binds him to this servitude in order to maintain 
for plaintiff, who has never worked, an alimony income 
(disregarding return from a now liquified property 
award of over $100,000) higher than the salary of district 
court judges. 
POINT II. 
THE COURT ERRED BY RULING THAT 
THE RECORD DOES NOT SUPPORT THE 
CONTENTION THAT THE ORIGINAL ALI-
MONY DECREE vV AS BASED, IN PART, 
UPON THE TRIAL COURT'S CONTENTION 
THAT THE MAJOR EXPENSE OF REAR-
ING THE PARTIES'S DAUGHTER, THEN 
LIVING WITH PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, 
HAD BEEN ASSUMED BY PLAINTIFF-
APPELLANT. 
There is no question whatsoever that Christine, thr 
parties' daughter, had reached her majority by the time 
of the divorce. One of the major points relied upon hy 
plaintiff in arguing for the notoriously high award in 
this case was: 
4 
''Mr. Sorenson disclaims anything but a 
moral obligation on a voluntary basis with respect 
to Christine, who still lives with her mother while 
attending the University and who is unmarried." 
Tliis is an exact quote from an exhibit (Exhibit 4) pre-
pared hy plaintiff to persuade the Court to impose a 
heavy burden on defendant. Whether or not plaintiff 
al'f11ally assumed the major expense of Christine's main-
tenance before her marriage, it is clear that the trial 
judge was induced to establish the level of defendant's 
ohligations on the representation that plaintiff would 
l1ace to assume that expense. 
'rhe very same judge who signed the decree also 
ordered the modification. He knows to what degree he 
was influenced, in fixing the alimony, by the plaintiff's 
nssertiou that she would have to take care of Christine. 
It is not important that defendant may have contributed 
1o (:hristine 's maintenance; what is important is that 
the trial court, in preparing the decree, assumed that 
defendant would not contribute. 
POINT III. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING 
THAT NO EVIDENCE WAS GIVEN OR 
OFFERED TO SHOW THAT THERE HAD 
BEEN SUBSTANTIAL IMPROVEMENT IN 
THE LIQUIDITY OF AND THE INCOME 
~'ROM THE WIFE'S SEPARATE PROP-
~~RTY. 
Ddendant-respondent has twice protested, before 
tlii:-; Court, the manifest inequity entailed in the award 
5 
to plaintiff-appellant of a large portion of defrndaut', 
inheritance as a part of the marital estate. X everthell·~,, 
the conrt has nplwlcl th(• award to plaintiff of properly 
':alned nt approximately $12;),000.00. :\Inch of the valnl 
of the property awarded plaintiff, hO"wever, lay in a 
lar,c.;c pieee of realty inelnc1i11g the home in which the 
parties hacl lin'c1. This was not income prodneiug prop-
erty ancl not n'adily marketable hccause so fe,y people of 
the community can afford so palatial a residence. This 
factor \ms heavily ex11loitccl by plaintiff-appellant in 
lier argumc11t for the high lcYel of payments defendant 
wns ordered to make. Again we quote from plaiidi/f'.1 
cxhil1it ( l<~xhil)it +) prcsenkL1 to the trial court at t111, 
time of the frial of the original cause: 
"One of the nove 1 features of the case is a 
plan of orderly liquidation of the assets witl1 high 
intrinsic ntlues hut not readily marketable." 
'' ]j~arl!- in the controversy the defendant 
stopped plaintiff's credit with former trade ac-
counts including the srn-ices of I\Ir. Don Andrns, 
tl1<:> gardener, and Kent Anderson the handy man. 
:\[rs. Sorensen re-employed l\Ir. Andrus for work 
around the home and the adjourning acreagr•, 
honowing money for that purpose, she incapable 
of performing the necessary physical labor in the 
premises.'' 
Plai11tiff 's argument to the trial court was this: 
>"OU haYe g-in•11 nw \'aluahle property, lmt its O\Y11cn:hip 
is not au m1mixccl hkssing. I ha,,e to pay a. man to 
maintain it. This factu1· should he recognized when the 
eonrt clPeiclcs how mnch m011Py the dcfcrn1ant has to pay. 
By the timr' of the hc:ui11g 011 the petition for modi 
6 
l'ic;llio11, this situation ha<l completely changed. The 
ltu11-11rodnc-tive property had been sold (Record 69). 
J)(·frndant-respondent offered to prove that plaintiff-
:1ppella11t liad received her share of the sale proceeds 
111 ('/l sh ( Heconl 70) and the amount of those proceeds. 
!'i<lilltiff-appellant ol;jected to such evidence, and the 
1 ri;d rourt refused to receive it. 
It is frustrating, indeed, to read in this Court's 
ilL·cic:ion that no eYidence >vas adduced or offered as to 
t!H· sale of the non-productive assets and the amount of 
tl1r: prnceeds. Defendant-respondent did testify that the 
prnpc•rty \ms sold and offered to prove that plaintiff 
n·cciH·d her sharC> in cash. If this Court now concludes, 
n., we do, that it was C>rror for the trial court to exclude 
tLl' e\-idc·nce of plaintiff-appellant's cash receipts from 
tlH• i'ale, then this Court should remand the cause with 
iw-:t met ions that the trial court receive the evidence. 
ft' a trial court has committed error by refusing to 
aclmi1 competent evidence offered by a losing litigant, 
tl:is comt remands the cause with instructions that the 
trial ('onrt receive the evidence. vVe fail to see the justice 
i11 n·n·rsing- a trial court decision on the grounds that 
it w•eds the support of Hidence which was offered but 
11ot recei ,-e1l, hut denying the prevailing party the oppor-
lunit>· to present that evidence. 
Dc•frndant-respoudent 's proof is that, at the time 
11 f tl1P (lecree, plaintiff's alimony income was decreased 
I·~- t lie cost of maintaining the aforesaid realty. At the 
lim1· of the hearing on the petition for modification, 
7 
plaintiff's alimony income was or should have been 
angmcnted by return on investment of cash received 
from the sale of that realty. The Record, in our view, 
sufficiently supports those finding·s now because it con. 
tains the evidence that the parties have sold the prop. 
erty about which plaintiff complained because it was 
costly to maintain. 
The trial judge alone knows to what degree he was 
influenced, in fixing the alimony level, by plaintiff's 
nrgument that she must hear the expense of maintaining 
the estate on which she was living. This same judge 
Eigned the order reducing the alimony. 
POINT IV. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY FAILING 
TO DEFER TO THE TRIAL COURT'S DIS-
CRETION IN REGARD TO THE MODIFI-
CATION OF AN ALIMONY AW ARD. 
\Ve have pointed out that the judge who originally 
heard the cause also heard the petition for modification 
and signed the order. If he originally believed (as plain· 
tiff urged him to believe) that plaintiff would have to 
maintain Christine through college and that plaintiff 
was unable to maintain her residence without hiring help, 
there is plenty of evidence in this record that those prob-
lems no longer existed in 1967. 
The trin] judge has statutory discretion to make 
such chang0s in a cliYorce decree as may be ''reasonable 
and proper.'' This Court has often said it will not 
8 
distnrh au order effecting such a change unless there 
lrns been an abuse of discretion. 
We submit that, by the decision herein, this Court 
lias disregarded the element of trial court discretion. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court has declared, without justification, (1) 
that defendant-respondent's reduction in income was 
rnluntary and (2) that no evidence was adduced or 
offered to show the changes in Plaintiff-appellant's 
financial condition which the trial court found. 
If the record fails to support the findings m any 
mat0rial respect, it is because the trial court refused 
lo receive competent evidence. At the very least, de-
fendant should be permitted to present his evidence 
d1irh so clearly demonstrates significant amelioration 
i11 plaintiff-appellant's income and expense situation 
~.mrP the original decree. 
Respectfully submitted, 
FRANK J. ALLEN 
CLYDE, MECHAM & PRATT 
351 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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